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BIWEEKLY REPORT

COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

15 April 1966



THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington 25, D. C. 15 April 1966

MEMORANDUM

Attached is a compilation of Communist statements on possible direct military intervention in the Vietnam situation, and on possible negotiations toward a settlement, received since our last biweekly report (OCI No. 0507/66) issued 30 March 1966.

SUMMARY

NEGOTIATIONS

INTERVENTION

USSR The occasion of the 23rd Soviet party Congress brought no change in Moscow's position on the question of negotiations.

During the Congress Soviet speakers reiterated well-worn public expressions of support for the DRV, giving no indication of any change in Moscow's previous stance.

China Peking continues to oppose any negotiated settlement of the Vietnam problem except on the Communist terms.

Chinese statements continue to imply that there will be no Sino-US war unless the US attacks China. In private conversations with Pakistani leaders, Liu Shao-chi reiterated Peking's pledge first made publicly last spring to provide troops if requested by Hanoi.

DRV Hanoi used the first anniversary of the promulgation of its four-point proposal for settling the war to demonstrate that in the intervening year its position on settling the war had not budged. Articles on the occasion restated the original four-points verbatim and asserted once again that the US must accept them all and prove it by "concrete deeds" before any settlement of the Vietnam war can be envisaged.

While Hanoi has made no significant statements on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks, it has replayed statements by Soviet officials at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU pledging volunteers when the North Vietnamese deem them "necessary."

NEGOTIATIONS

NFLSV There have been no significant statements by the Front of the subject of negotiations during the past two weeks. All indications suggest however, that the Front's position on settling the war has not changed.

INTERVENTION

The Liberation Front has made no significant state-ments on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks.

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention

Selected Soviet Public Statements Selected Soviet Private Statements

Comments

2 April 1966: Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated General-Secretary Brezhnev's statement before the Congress a few days earlier that the Soviet Union "will render ever increasing support to Vietnam," and added this "must be taken seriously" by those who "unleashed" the war.

2 April 1966: Minister of Defense Malinovskiy, in his speech before the Congress, stated, "The USSR has given and will continue to give selfless and resolute aid to heroic Vietnam in its just struggle."

4 April 1966: During his speech before the Congress General Aleksey Yepishev, political chief of the Soviet armed forces asserted that thousands of Russians, including "the personnel of whole military units," had volunteered to fight for the freedom of the Vietnamese people.

Moscow's public expressions of support for the DRV remained unchanged throughout the Congress.

Malinovskiy's routine report on the state of preparedness of the Soviet armed forces was moderate in tone and stressed the "defensive" character of the Soviet military.

Occasionally during the past year various Soviet officials and propaganda organs have made references to alleged volunteers for the Vietnam war. Moscow appears to be primarily interested in the propaganda value of such statements particularly their utility in substantiating the USSR's "revolutionary character" in the face of Chinese charges of "capitulation."

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Selected Soviet Public Statements Selected Soviet Private Statements

Comments

5 April 1966: During his economic report to the Congress Premier Kosygin stated that "the international situation has been seriously complicated" lately because of the "aggressive war in Vietnam," and consequently the Soviet Government "had to increase defense expenditures." Later in his speech he added the Soviet Union "shall continue" to give the Vietnamese "assistance in the necessary proportions" until victory is achieved.

8 April 1966: The "Draft Declaration on Vietnam" was read to the Congress by Politburo member Suslov. It reiterated the well-worn Soviet theme that the USSR "has constantly rendered and is rendering the Vietnamese people large scale, all-round aid and support."

While the new economic plan does suggest there will be some increase in outlays on defense, there are apparently to be no major shifts in the allocation of resources for defense. Kosygin's comments on defense expenditures are similar to other references by Soviet leaders and seem to be particularly aimed at those susceptible to Chinese charges that Moscow's support of Vietnam is insufficient. In this connection the USSR would like to dramatize the impact the US involvement in Vietnam has had on the chances for a mutual reduction in defense budgets.

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	Approved For	Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T008	326A000600010060-3 25X:
Г	Selected Chinese Public Statements	Selected Chinese Private Statements	25X
	6 April 1966: In a long editorial apparently prepared		As has been the case with all
	to appear at the same time as Peking's 400th serious warning to the US, the People's Daily declared that the US is preparing "to impose war on the Chinese people." Asserting that China must be prepared for a war to be fought "this year		Chinese public statements, the editorial implies that a Sino-US war would be caused by a US attack.
25X1	or next" as well as for one to be fought by the next or follow- ing generations, the editorial added that "it is the US im- perialists and not we that		25X1
	13 April 1966: Commenting on the shootdown of a US Navy KA-3B Skywarrior off the Liuchow Peninsula on 12 April, the People's Daily declared that "We are well prepared for any provocations by the US imperialists. If they dare to come we will strike resolutely."		

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Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010060-3 COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Negotiations

Selected Soviet Public Statements

Selected Soviet Private Statements

Comments

2 April 1966: Foreign Minister Gromyko reaffirmed Moscow's familiar public position that the "program" of the DRV and the "platform" of the NFLSV is a "fair basis" for a settlement in Vietnam.

8 April 1966: Politburo member Suslov, while reading the "Draft Declaration on Vietnam" to the Congress restated Moscow's standard position that, "the Vietnamese question can be resolved only on the basis of the recognition of the just demands of the DRV Government and the NFLSV."

Gromyko broke no new ground in his relatively restrained exposition of the Soviet Union's "peaceful" and "disinterested" foreign policy-one of the main themes of the Congress.

Moscow's public position on this question remains unchanged.

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		Selected Ch	inese Communist	References	to Negotia	tions	
25X1	Selected Chinese Public Statements		Selected Ch Private Stat			Comments	
he	April 1966: Liu Ning- ead of the Chinese dele ation to the 21st na-	.y1, :-					
Co	ional conference of the ommunist Party of New						
cc	ealand, declared at the onference that "the Chi						
th	ese people firmly suppo he 4-point stand of the	•					
	RV and the 5-point stat ent of <u>the Liberation</u>	:e-					
Fr	ront."						
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Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations

Selected DRV Public Statements

Selected DRV Private Statements

Comments

In recent weeks Hanoi and the Liberation Front in their prop-

aganda have been mentioning

the possibility of cooperation between the NVLSV and the various

struggle groups participating

in the current political unrest

in South Vietnam. At the same

time, both have continued to

in South Vietnam must be in accordance with the program of

the Liberation Front.

insist that any settlement of the war and future government

30 March 1966: A Hanoi commentary on recent statements by Vice President Humphrey stated in part that "the only way for our people to save themselves is to raise up more strongly to engage in a life-or-death struggle against the US imperialists and to join the revolutionary forces in the rural areas in completely overthrowing the US recolonialists regime, chasing the US imperialists away from South Vietnam, establishing a coalition government, and achieving independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality, as outlined in the NFLSV's platform. This is the only 25X1 correct way to end the present dark, life and achieve

a bright future.

31 March 1966: Hanoi radio rebroadcast Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's remarks on Vietnam at the Soviet Party Congress. In part the broadcast quoted the Soviet leader as demanding that "the US imperialists stop the aggressive

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Vietnamese statements on the

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proceedings at the Soviet Party Congress have naturally focused chiefly on statements and resolutions related to Vietnam. Hanoi propaganda on the congress and North Vietnamese officials involved in it generally

Selected DRV Public Statements Selected DRV Private Statements

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Comments

31 March 1966 Cont'd: war
in Vietnam, withdraw US and
satellite troops from South
Vietnam, let the Vietnamese
people settle their own affairs themselves, and accept
the stands of the DRV Govern25X1 ment and the NFLSV as a basis
for the settlement of the

Vietnam problem.

7 April 1966: Hanoi broadcast a lengthy editorial in the party theoretical journal Hoc Tap on the occasion of the first anniversary of the promulgation of the DRV fourpoint proposal for settling the Vietnam war. The editorial restated the original four points verbatim and declared that the four point are a package and cannot be separated. It declared that the US must accept these points 25X1 and prove it by concrete deeds if there is gong to be a settlement of the war.

8 April 1966: An article in the party daily Nhan Dan was to voted to the first anninversary of the announcement of the DRV's four point proposal for settling the Vietnam war. The article, like an editorial in the party theoritical journal the previous day, focused on

attempted to stick to Vietnam related events and sought to avoid any controversy related to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

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Hanoi's emphasis at this time on the fact that its position on settling the war has not changed one bit in the year since its four points were announced may in part have been directed to Peking as evidence of Hanoi's continuing determination to carry on the war and to the Liberation Front to shore up morale in the face of further US troop commitments.

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Selected DRV Public Statements Selected DRV Private Statements

Comments

8 April 1966 Cont'd: the contention that US refusal to accept point three of the program which calls for the settlement of the South Vietnamese problem without foreign interference and in accordance 25X1 with the Liberation Front's program, would prevent any

negotiated settlement.

9 April 1966: In a broadcast on the US position on settling the war, Hanoi radio declared in part that: "The four-point stand of the DRV Government is the embodiment of the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam. It also took into account the situation which has developed in Vietnam and is a perfect answer to the deep aspirations of its people. It constitutes 25X1 an adequate basis for a correct settlement of the Vietnam problem. It is a stand of peace."

10 April 1966: An editorial in the Hanoi party daily, Nhan Dan, expressed sincere gratitude to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU for its wholehearted support for the Vietnamese people in their "just struggle against US aggression." The editorial recounted

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Selected DRV Public Statements Selected DRV Private Statements

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Comments

10 April 1966 Cont'd: that the CPSU holds the view that the Vietnam question "can only be solved on the basis of the DRV and the NFLSV programs. It demanded that the US put an immediate end to the bombings of the DRV and to all other acts of aggression against it, that the armed forces of the US and its satellites be withdrawn from South Vietnam territory, that the NFLSV be recognized as the sole valid and legal representative of the South Vietnamese people, that the US Government stop interfering 25X1 in the internal affairs of Vietnam and strictly abide by the 1954 Geneva agreements."

> 11 April 1966: In an interview with a Japanese correspondent on 14 March, broadcast on 11 April, Ho Chi Minh restated Hanoi's positions on settling the Vietnam war. In part he declared that in his letter of 24 January to heads of states he had expounded the "reasonable and logical stand of our government and people for a settlement of the Vietnam problem." This be stated, "is a correct stand for peace. Therefore, this stand is being approved and supported by the

The DRV president in similar interviews over the past year has repeatedly outlined the DRV's "just position" on settling the war to sympathetic journalists. Of late, he has use the language of his 24 January letter to heads of states as a statement of that "just position." In essence the letter contains a reiteration of the DRV's four-point proposal. In addition, the letter insisted that the US accept all four points and prove it by "concrete deeds."

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Selected DRV Public Statements

Selected DRV Private Statements

 ${\tt Comments}$

ll April 1966 Cont'd: leaders, governments and peoples of an increasing number of countries."

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